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Abstract 
Based on the quarterly data of all A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2019, this article uses the 
multi period double difference model to explore the causes and transmission mechanism of the linkage 
effect of the stock prices of the two cities after the implementation of the “Land-Hong Kong Stock 
Connect”. The results show that: first, after the implementation of “Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect”, 
the degree of herd behavior of domestic investors as a whole becomes higher, and the larger the 
company scale is, the higher the degree of herd behavior of investors is; secondly, after the 
implementation of “Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect”, all listed companies have the behavior of 
internal investors imitating external investors, especially small and medium-sized companies; finally, 
from the overall sample From the point of view, the imitation behavior of internal investors is indeed 
conducted through the investor network, but it is divided into three categories: large, medium and 
small companies. Only the imitation transmission path of large companies is the investor network, and 
small and medium companies do not realize the imitation behavior through the network. The research 
of this article is helpful to appeal for rational investment of investors and provide empirical evidence 
support for further opening of capital market. 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
Herding behavior in financial market is a kind of special irrational behavior, which means that investors 
tend to ignore their valuable private information and follow the decision-making mode of most people 
in the market. Herding behavior shows that in a certain period, a large number of investors adopt the 
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same investment strategy or have the same preference for specific assets. One of the biggest 
characteristics of herding behavior is that investors imitate each other. The imitation theory was first 
developed by Jean Gabriel Tarde pointed out that imitation is the most basic social relationship, and 
society is a group of individuals who imitate each other. Because of the characteristics of China’s 
capital market, herd behavior is very significant in China. 
In order to promote the opening of the capital market and improve the phenomenon of irrational 
imitation in China, China has successively promulgated the Interim Measures for the administration of 
domestic securities investment by qualified overseas institutional investors (referred to as QFII), the 
pilot measures for domestic securities investment by fund management companies and RMB qualified 
overseas institutional investors of securities companies (referred to as RQFII), and officially launched 
in November 2014 Shanghai Hong Kong Stock Exchange interconnection mechanism pilot (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Shanghai-Hong Kong stock connect”) was officially launched in December 2016 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Shenzhen-Hong Kong stock connect”). In this article, the “Shanghai 
Hong Kong stock connect” and “Shenzhen-Hong Kong stock connect” is collectively referred to as 
“Land-Hong Kong stock connect”, which will not be described in detail later). The implementation of 
“Land-Hong Kong stock connect” is another important attempt and Exploration on the road of capital 
market opening in China after QFII, RQFII and other systems. At the same time, it also provides a good 
quasi natural experimental environment for the study of the effect of capital market opening. Although 
the implementation of “Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect” is conducive to promoting the integration of 
China’s capital market and international capital market, it also inevitably brings about the problem of 
volatility risk of stock price linkage. Now a large number of literature studies have shown that the 
implementation of “Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect” will increase the stock price linkage between 
land port and Hong Kong, but the research on the underlying causes of stock price linkage between the 
two places still exists There is a certain blank. At the same time, overseas institutional investors are 
considered to have professional teams and have strong ability to obtain and analyze information. Under 
the condition of information asymmetry, domestic investors may choose to imitate the investment 
behavior of overseas investors. Is the reason for the stock price linkage after the implementation of 
“Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect” due to the increase of domestic herding behavior? Is it true that 
domestic investors imitate foreign investors? This is an important issue in this article. 
At the same time, the investor network is one of the important ways for investors to obtain information. 
Investors can obtain information through the network, observe and imitate the investment behavior of 
others. Foreign institutional investors have strong ability to obtain and analyze information, which 
makes it possible for domestic investors to imitate the investment behavior of foreign investors through 
the network. Therefore, this article further studies whether the internal investors realize their own 
imitation behavior through the transmission mechanism of investor network. 
The results of this study show that: after the implementation of Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect, the 
degree of herd behavior of the whole investors in China has become higher, and the larger the company 
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scale is, the higher the degree of herd behavior of investors is; at the same time, there are behaviors of 
internal investors imitating external investors in all listed companies, but only the imitation 
transmission path of large companies is the investor network, and the imitation path of small and 
medium-sized companies has not yet been. It can be seen that further research is needed. 
The contribution of this article is as follows: firstly, this article deeply studies the causes of stock price 
linkage between Hong Kong and land, fills in the gap in the causes of linkage effect, and further 
deepens the understanding of stock price linkage effect between Hong Kong and land; secondly, this 
article further explores the transmission path of imitation behavior, and provides some ideas and 
methods for the follow-up study of this issue. In addition, as an important national pilot project, it is of 
great practical significance to comprehensively analyze its policy effect. The conclusion of this article 
provides some enlightenment for calling for rational investment of investors and further opening of 
capital market. 
The follow-up arrangement of this article is as follows: the second part reviews relevant literature and 
puts forward hypothesis, the third part describes model and research design, the fourth part is empirical 
results and analysis, and the last part is conclusion and enlightenment. 
 
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
2.1 Herd Behavior in China’s Capital Market 
Compared with overseas developed capital markets, China’s capital market has its own characteristics: 
the information disclosure system is not perfect, the information is severely asymmetric (Peng, 2000), 
there are more retail investors among investors, and the speculative atmosphere is heavier (Guo & Wu, 
2004), in addition to the fund manager’s pursuit of reputation, herd instincts (Song & Wu, 2001), these 
have provided a petri dish for the breeding of herd behavior, so in China, blindly imitating the trend 
Phenomenon occurs from time to time. In order to promote the opening of China’s capital market and 
improve domestic irrational investment behavior, on November 5, 2002, the “Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Domestic Securities Investment by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors” was 
officially promulgated. The scale of assets managed by institutional investors began to increase. Its 
market share is also increasing. Institutional investors are generally considered to have a professional 
team and strong information analysis and processing capabilities, which can improve the efficiency of 
stock pricing (Li et al., 2011; Bae et al., 2012; Shi et al., 2009; Rao, 2013), This can alleviate domestic 
herd behavior, but existing research shows that QFII’s entry into the Chinese market has not eased herd 
behavior in China. Like domestic institutional investors, QFII’s herd behavior is also very significant 
(Liu et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008), the reason why QFII showed significant herd behavior may be that 
China’s capital market was not yet open, the channels for foreign investors to collect information were 
single, and the information disclosure system of domestic listed companies was incomplete, which led 
to the concentration of external investors. Invest in listed companies with more standard information 
disclosure (Liu et al., 2007). Compared with small companies, large companies generally have more 
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standardized information disclosure and are more inclined to voluntary information disclosure due to 
high agency costs, large information requirements, and lower costs of preparing and publishing 
information (Zhong et al., 2005; Liu, 2008; Fang et al., 2009), so foreign capital will also tend to invest 
in larger companies. This may lead to the phenomenon of “grouping together” by external investors 
after the implementation of the land-port link mechanism to promote the further opening of the 
domestic capital market. Therefore, this article proposes the hypothesis H1. 
H1: After the implementation of Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect, the degree of domestic herd 
behavior has increased, and the larger the company scale, the higher the herd behavior. 
2.2 Imitation Theory and Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect Mechanism 
The founder of imitation theory Jean Gabriel Tarde proposed the following imitation laws in 1890: the 
law of distance, the closer the distance, the stronger the imitation; the top-down law, the inferior 
imitates the superior, the lower-level characters imitate the upper-level characters; This opposite style 
prevails at the same time. One style can replace the other style. Once the old style declines, the new 
style rises. These three laws also apply in the capital market. 
In order to promote the joint development of the mainland and Hong Kong capital markets and the 
further opening up of the domestic capital market, on April 10, 2014, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission officially approved the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect pilot. On November 17, 2014, 
the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect trading system was officially implemented. The first batch of 
Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect stocks included the SSE 180 Index, SSE 380 Index constituent 
stocks, and 568 eligible stocks of A + H listed companies. Since the launch of the Shanghai-Hong Kong 
Stock Connect pilot, the overall operation has been stable and orderly, which has provided valuable 
experience for the implementation of the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect trading system. On 
December 5, 2016, Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect was officially launched. The first list of 
Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect includes the Shenzhen Component Index. SZSE Small and 
Medium Innovation Index and 882 eligible stocks listed in the A + H shares. At present, the number of 
stocks that comply with the land-port link is continuously expanding. 
The implementation of the land-port link will help attract foreign capital to flow into the A-share 
market, improve the valuation system that differs significantly between A-shares and overseas markets, 
and further increase the vitality of the A-share market. The Hong Kong stock market can be said to be 
one of the more mature overseas markets. After Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect cooperates with 
Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect to fully open the A-share and H-share channels, it is more 
conducive to the introduction of overseas institutional investors and gradually change the market 
structure and training led by retail investors. Long-term investment concept. This will promote the 
integration of domestic capital markets and overseas capital markets (Pang et al., 2017), but this may 
also enhance the linkage between a country’s economy and the international market. Liu et al. (2016) 
applied the dual differential model to Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect A study on the volatility of 
A-share prices shows that the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect trading mechanism not only did not 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf         Journal of Economics and Public Finance                     Vol. 6, No. 2, 2020 
42 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
stabilize the stock price at the beginning of the policy, but played a negative role of “chasing up and 
down”. This phenomenon is no longer significant after the policy has been fully advanced, Zhang et al. 
(2014) and Feng et al. (2016) use Granger causality test to confirm that the implementation of the 
Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect has significantly enhanced the volatility spillover effect of the 
Shanghai stock market on the Hong Kong stock market, while the implementation of the 
Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect has played a role in diverting funds, making Shanghai The 
correlation between Hong Kong and Hong Kong has been reduced (Pang et al., 2017), but Tang et al. 
(2018) used Gaussian Copula function and t-Copula function to fit stock index returns. The research 
results show that in Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect and Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect 
Under the China-Hong Kong Stock Connect policy, there is still a synergy effect between the stock 
markets of the two places. After the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect was launched, it was more 
volatile than the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect (Duan, 2018, etc.), in the long run, the linkage 
effect between the two places can be enhanced more (Wang & Dong, 2018). The existing literature has 
conducted a very comprehensive study on the linkage between the stock markets of the two places after 
the implementation of the land-port link mechanism. Few literatures have explored the underlying 
causes of the linkage effect between the stock markets of the mainland and Hong Kong. 
According to Tarde’s “Three Laws of Imitation”, the implementation of the land-port link allows a 
large amount of external funds to flow into the country, and there is no obstacle to the interaction 
between internal and external funds, so there will be internal and external imitations; external investors 
are mostly developed market institutional investors with strong information. The ability to collect, 
analyze, and process, while domestic investors are mainly retail, and the ability to collect, analyze, and 
process information is weak, so internal investors will imitate the investment behavior of external 
investors. Due to the imitating behavior of internal investors to external investors, the stock prices of 
the two places are linked. Therefore, this article proposes hypothesis H2: 
H2: One of the reasons for the linkage effect after the implementation of Land-Hong Kong Stock 
Connect is the existence of internal investors imitating the behavior of external investors. 
2.3 Inter-organizational Imitation via Investor Networks 
The investor network is an important way to pass information between investors. Investors can not only 
pass information through the network, but also observe the behavior of other investors through the 
network. They can influence their investment decisions through their own rational analysis or 
emotional perception (Xiao et al., 2012). Closely connected investors have stronger correlations in their 
investment behaviors and are more likely to have herd behavior (Pareek, 2012). They participate in the 
market through the Internet and observe and imitate each other (Liu & Su, 2016). In fact, 
inter-organizational imitation is a very common way of organizational behavior. Emerging technologies, 
management methods, and choices for entering new markets all have inter-organizational imitation 
(Li-eberman & Asaba, 2006). For example, in sociology, “Isomorphism of Institutions” (Dimaggio & 
Powell, 1983), “Embedded Networks” (Granovetter, 1985), Management Cost and Risk Sharing (Levitt 
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& March, 1988), also in Economics There are also studies such as “herd behavior” (Chang et al., 1997). 
For example, Xiao et al. (2012) confirmed that the herd behavior of fund managers in the same network 
is obvious. Although the subject areas involved are different, these studies have tried to answer the 
following three questions: imitation motivation, imitation information channels, and imitation behavior 
patterns. The motivation for imitation has been described above. Since external investors are mostly 
institutional investors in developed markets and have strong information collection, analysis, and 
processing capabilities, while domestic investors are mainly retail investors, whose ability to collect, 
analyze, and process information is weak. In the case of asymmetric market information, internal 
investors will imitate the behavior of external institutional investors in order to reduce the risk of 
uncertainty in decision-making. And this article tries to focus on answering the question about imitating 
information channels: internal investors observe the investment behavior of institutional investors 
through the investor network to imitate and make their own investment decisions based on the 
information transmitted on the network, so this article proposes hypothesis H3: 
H3: Internal investors imitate external investors through the investor network. 
 
3. Model Description and Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Source 
This article uses the “Top Ten Mobile Shareholder Details” reported in all A-share listed companies 
from the 2011 mid-term report to the 2019 third quarter report as the initial sample. The data comes 
from the Choice financial terminal, and the data is processed according to the following steps: First, 
remove Financial industry, ST company, * ST company sample data; second, remove missing data 
samples; third, in order to reduce the impact of extreme values, this article performs a winsorize 
processing on all continuous variable data at the level of 1%, while controlling the industry and 
quarterly Fixed effects. The standard error of all regression analysis in this article is adjusted at the 
company level by Cluster-robust. The final sample size was 80,104. 
3.2 Herd Behavior 
One of the main variables in this article is to use the standard commonly used in the study of herd 
behavior: standard deviation. This index is used in many literatures such as Song and Wu (2001), 
Hwang and Salmon (2004), Li, Rhee and Wang (2009) and Li Yu and Yang (2010), etc. 
The herd behavior of an investor is defined as the standard deviation of the investor’s holding of each 
stock position𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑗,𝑡, as shown in formula (1). The more consistent investor behavior, the more 
obvious herd behavior, and the smaller the standard deviation 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑗,𝑡. 
𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑗,𝑡 =
√∑ (∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 − ∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
2𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁 − 1
#(1)  
In formula (1), ∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 represents the change in the position of the investor holding the 𝑗-th 
stock in the 𝑡-th quarter compared to the previous quarter,  ∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡  indicates the average 
position change of investors holding the 𝑗-th stock in the 𝑡-th quarter compared to the previous quarter, 
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and 𝑁 indicates non-new investors who hold the 𝑗-th stock in the 𝑡-th quarter. 
 
Table 1. Variable Definition 
variable meaning Detailed definition 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 
Changes in positions of all 
investors 
Investor’s position of the 𝑗-th stock in the 𝑡-th quarter. (unit:%) 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
Average change in 
positions of all investors 
The average position held by investors in the 𝑡-th quarter compared to the previous quarter 
(unit:%) 
∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 
Position changes by 
outside investors 
Positions of external investors in the 𝑡-th quarter compared to the previous quarter (unit:%) 
∆𝐼𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 
Changes in positions of 
internal investors 
Positions of internal investors in the 𝑡-th quarter compared to the previous quarter for the 𝑗-th 
stock (unit:%) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 Policy effect 
When the company is on the list of dry ports, it is 1 after the year of implementation, otherwise 
it is 0 
𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 Current ratio Current assets divided by current liabilities 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 Cash flow ratio Net cash flow from operating activities divided by operating income 
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡 
Shareholdings of the top 
ten shareholders 
(Total number of shares held by the top ten shareholders / total share capital) × 100% 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡 
Institutional investor 
shareholding 
(Total number of institutional shares held / total equity) × 100% 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 Earnings per share 
Current net profit attributable to ordinary shareholders
∑(Number of common shares outstanding × Number of months issued)/12
 
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 
Total operating income per 
share 
Total operating income / end-period paid-in capital (unit: yuan) 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡 Stock turnover ∑ [
Volume on a single trading day (shares)
Total number of current shares (shares)
] × 100% 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗,𝑡 Return on assets 
EBIT × 2
Total assets at the beginning of the period +  total assets at the end of the period
× 100% 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡 Current assets ratio Non-current assets divided by total assets 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 Assets and liabilities Total liabilities divided by total assets 
𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 Two jobs in one If the chairman and the general manager are the same person, the value is 1; otherwise, it is 0. 
𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 Board size Natural logarithm of the total number of board members. 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑗,𝑡 Independent director ratio The number of independent directors divided by the total number of board members. 
𝑆𝑂𝐸 Property right The value is 1 when the company’s actual controller is state-owned, otherwise it is 0. 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡 Time to market The natural logarithm of the number of years the company has been listed in the current period. 
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𝐵𝑟𝑔4 
Four audit dummy 
variables 
When the accounting firm hired is “Big Four”, the value is 1; otherwise, it is 0. 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 Asset size Natural logarithm of total market value of listed companies 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 Quarter dummy variable  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 Industry dummy variables  
 
3.3 Exploration on the Causes of the Linkage between the Stock Markets of the Mainland and Hong 
Kong 
Before the implementation of Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect mechanism, the inflow of overseas 
funds into China was only through the QFII mechanism. After the implementation of the Land-Hong 
Kong Stock Connect mechanism, Hong Kong Securities Clearing Co., Ltd. could be entrusted as a 
nominal holder. Therefore, the definition of an external investor as a shareholder is “QFII”, “Hong 
Kong Securities Clearing Co., Ltd.” and “Hong Kong Securities Clearing (Agent) Co., Ltd.” terms, 
internal investors are defined as all other investors who do not contain these terms in the nature of 
shareholders. This article uses Li et al. (2010) to study whether there is an indicator of imitation in 
investors in herd behavior: changes in investor positions to study imitation between internal investment 
and external investors. For the study of imitation behavior, all investors are divided into external 
investors and internal investors. Since the implementation of the two policies of Shanghai-Hong Kong 
Stock Connect and Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect from 2011 to 2019, that is, the 
implementation time of the policies is different, a multi-period double difference model is considered, 
referring to the multi-period DID analysis method of Beck et al. (2010). Its basic form is as follows: 
∆𝐼𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 × ∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 +
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡(2)
 
In formula (2), ∆𝐼𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 represents the change in the position of the internal investor holding 
the 𝑗-th stock in the 𝑡-th quarter compared to the previous quarter. ∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 represents the 
change in the position of an external investor holding the 𝑗-th stock in the 𝑡 − 1 quarter compared to 
the previous quarter. 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 refers to the effect of the implementation of the land-port link policy. The 
latter is 1, otherwise it is 0, which indicates the net effect of the policy. In the multi-period DID, due to 
the different time of policy implementation, there are no 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 in the model, and the 
interaction terms 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 and ∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 can explore the effect of the independent variable 
on the dependent variable before and after the policy is implemented, which makes the multi-period 
double difference more flexible. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡  represents a series of control variables, 
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 and ∑ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 represent the industry and quarterly fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 represents 
the residual term. 𝛽1 is the coefficient of main concern. If 𝛽1 is significantly positive, it indicates that 
one of the reasons for the linkage effect between the stock markets of the two places after Land-Hong 
Kong Stock Connect is that internal investors imitate external investors; otherwise, it indicates that the 
linkage effect between the two stock markets is not due to internal investors. Imitation of external 
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investors. 
This article chooses the lagging term of external investors to prevent “pseudo-herd” behavior. 
“Pseudo-herd” behavior refers to investors taking similar decisions when facing similar decision 
problems and information sets. Such situations can be understood as investors It happens to be similar 
decisions, not to imitate each other. Considering that the data selected by Li et al. (2010) is daily data, 
the data comes from TopView. The data was born on June 1, 2007, and disappeared on January 1, 2009. 
This article cannot obtain daily data in the same way. Therefore, quarterly data was used instead. Li et 
al. (2010) adopted data lagging five periods and lagging to eight periods in empirical tests. The 
conclusion remains unchanged. Considering that quarterly data is used in this article, data lagging one 
period are selected for research.  
3.4 Further Research: The Transmission Path of Herd Imitation—Investor Information Network 
In order to explore the transmission path of internal investors imitating external investors, referring to 
the methods of Xiao (2012) and Crane et al. (2017), whether any two investors jointly hold a large 
number of shares of any company to establish institutional investors Information networks, specifically, 
between any two investors, if they jointly hold at least the shares of any of the same companies at the 
end of the 𝑡 quarter and the proportion of shares in circulation is 5% or more, they There is an 
association between them (in the network, two investors are connected by a straight line) to define the 
network 𝑆(𝐼) of this investor 𝐼 as a set of other investors that are associated with it. 
The degree 𝐷(𝐼) of the investor 𝐼 is defined as the number of elements in the investor network 𝑆(𝐼). 
The investor 𝐼 holding stock 𝑗 is 𝐼(𝑗), and the information network 𝑇(𝑗) of stock 𝑗 is defined as 
the collection of elements 𝐾  in the investor information network 𝑆(𝐼(𝑗)) , that is, 
𝑇(𝑗) = {𝐾，𝐼(𝑗)：𝐾 ∈ 𝑆(𝐼(𝑗)); for example, stock j was held by two investors at the same time in a 
quarter with more than 5% of the number of shares outstanding. If you have your own network, then 
define the stock information network as a collection of these two investor networks. 
The network density of stock 𝑗 is defined as the ratio of the number of edges actually connected 
between nodes in the network 𝑇(𝑗) of stock 𝑗 to the maximum number of possible edges. The 
network density of stock j can be expressed as: 
𝐷𝑗 =
2𝐸𝑗
𝑘𝑗(𝑘𝑗 − 1)
#(3)  
Among them, 𝐸𝑗 is the number of edges actually connected in the stock information network 𝑇(𝑗); 𝑘𝑗 
is the number of investors in the stock information network 𝑇(𝑗). 
In order to eliminate the impact of stock market value, this article uses the method of Hong et al. (2000) 
and Nagel (2005) to perform regression analysis on the stock network density value and its own 
circulating market value. The specific form is as follows: 
ln (
𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝐷𝑗𝑡 − 1
) =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡 ln(𝑀𝑗) + 𝜀𝑡#(4)  
𝑅𝐶𝑗 = 𝜀𝑡#(5)  
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Among them, 𝐷𝑗𝑡 represents the network density value of each quarter of stock 𝑗, and 𝑀𝑗 represents 
the circulating market value of stock 𝑗 at the end of each quarter. As this article focuses on the 
information transmission path between domestic and foreign investors after the implementation of 
Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect, the stocks with external investors from the second quarter of 2014 to 
the third quarter of 2019 are selected for analysis. The influence of investors is not the influence 
between internal investors or between external investors, so this article only calculates the network 
density of stocks containing external investors, and defines 𝑅𝐶𝑗 as quarterly stocks containing external 
investors The market value adjusted residual network density value is used to measure the degree of 
information connection and diffusion of external investors in the investor information network. The 
model established is as follows: 
∆𝐼𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 × ∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡##(6)
 
In formula (6), ∆𝐼𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 represents the change in the position of the internal investor holding 
the 𝑗-th stock in the 𝑡-th quarter compared to the previous quarter, and 𝑅𝐶𝑗 is the Stock network 
density, other variables have the same meaning as in formula (2). 𝛽1 is the main coefficient concerned 
in this article. If 𝛽1 is not significant, it means that internal investors imitate external investors to 
increase or decrease their holdings of shares are not related to the information of external investors in 
the investor network. If 𝛽1 is significant, it means that internal investors imitate external investments. 
Investors do obtain external investor information through the investor network. 
 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean St.dev. Min Max 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 608,259 0.0944921 1.0988 -59.02 65.2 
∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 14,586 0.0123056 1.33152 -49.61 59.43 
∆𝐼𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 593,673 0.0965114 1.09238 -59.02 65.2 
𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 80,104 2.933982 16.71739 -60.95686 4010.502 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 80,104 0.0778562 1.0543 -171.6743 60.54544 
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡 80,104 59.27207 15.38798 1.310332 244.2684 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡 80,104 30.37312 23.43992 0 113.6913 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 80,104 0.2405875 0.478414 -7.8872 28.02 
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 80,104 3.976601 8.245211 -0.8716874 603.5945 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡 80,104 166.2583 185.6589 0.0098 2103.539 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗,𝑡 80,104 3.927247 7.522341 -186.8086 1061.563 
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𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡 80,104 42.58784 20.72152 0 99.1321 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 80,104 41.85416 29.38944 -68.38275 3443.177 
𝑆𝑂𝐸 80,104 0.3569565 0.479105 0 1 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑗,𝑡 80,104 18.3547 3.784363 1.904762 46.66667 
𝐵𝑟𝑔4 80,104 0.0621934 0.241508 0 1 
𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 80,104 0.2549029 0.435809 0 1 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡 80,104 2.491108 0.63417 0 3.401197 
𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 80,104 2.84886 0.214941 2.079442 4.65396 
 
4.2 Herd Behavior 
In order to verify the hypothesis H1, grouping according to 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛, and then calculating according to 
formula (1), the value of 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑗,𝑡 under the full sample is obtained. This article groups according to 
the previous literature experience and divides the sample into large Small, medium, and small 
companies: Sort according to the natural logarithm of the total market capitalization at the end of 2019, 
and calculate based on the natural logarithm. The natural companies with the largest third in the 
ranking are large companies, and those with the middle third are For the Chinese company, the lower 
third is the small company, and calculate the 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑗,𝑡 of each group, as shown in Table 3. As shown in 
Table 3, the value of 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑗,𝑡 in the full sample was 35.838779 before the land-port link, and the value 
of 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑗,𝑡) was 31.07442 in the full sample after the land-port link. After the implementation of the 
Hong Kong Stock Connect mechanism, the overall herd behavior was higher. From the grouping results, 
the value of the 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑗,𝑡 of the three types of companies before the implementation of the land-port 
link is greater than the value after the implementation of the land-port link, indicating that the degree of 
herd behavior of these three types of companies is higher than before. The values of 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑗,𝑡 for large, 
medium, and small companies are: 29.49098, 31.05645, and 33.22599 in sequence, indicating that the 
larger the company size, the higher the degree of herd behavior. This result supports Hypothesis H1: 
After the implementation of Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect mechanism, the larger the company, the 
higher the herd behavior’s degree. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Herd Behavior 
 
Mean Obs. 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 0 
Full sample 35.83879 63,966 
Small  35.43541 46,382 
Medium 37.0896 14,849 
Big  35.88868 2,735 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 1 
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Full sample 31.07442 16,139 
Small  33.22599 2,574 
Medium  31.05645 10,183 
Big  29.49098 3,382 
 
4.3 Imitation Effect 
Because the hypothesis of the dual-slave difference model is the parallel trend, this article uses PSM 
(Preference Score Matching) to perform one-to-one nearest neighbor matching within the caliper from 
the control group of the sample and the processing group. The matching radius is 0.01, The balance 
effect is shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. PSM Matching Balance Effect 
Variable Obs. 
Mean Difference Test Standardized Difference Test 
Treated Control T-test %bias bias 
𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 
U 2.1073 2.8456 -28.09*** -27.7 
95.8 
M 2.1073 2.0762 1.38 1.2 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 
U 0.11816 0.071 16.91*** 15.2 
98.1 
M 0.11816 0.11725 0.28 0.3 
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡 
U 63.101 58.314 36.09*** 31.4 
87.6 
M 63.101 62.506 3.46*** 3.9 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡 
U 37.754 28.451 45.87*** 39.8 
98.2 
M 37.754 37.918 -0.61 -0.7 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 
U 0.37614 0.20032 61.16*** 48.9 
88.2 
M 0.37614 0.35534 4.53*** 5.8 
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 
U 5.0356 3.3656 39.02*** 31.1 
94.7 
M 5.0356 4.9466 1.34 1.7 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡 
U 124.25 173.69 -33.08*** -30.8 
94.9 
M 124.25 121.74 1.62 1.6 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗,𝑡 
U 5.0861 3.6291 38.93*** 33.1 
99 
M 5.0861 5.1007 -0.28 -0.3 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡 
U 44.783 42.021 15.22*** 13.2 
98.6 
M 44.783 44.744 0.16 0.2 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 
U 45.973 40.345 30.39*** 27.3 
93.6 
M 45.973 46.334 -1.61 -1.7 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑗,𝑡 
U 18.097 18.405 -9.62*** -8.5 
75.1 
M 18.097 18.02 1.92* 2.1 
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𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡 
U 2.5334 2.4865 8.6*** 7.4 
-10.9 
M 2.5334 2.5855 -7.72*** -8.2 
𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 
U 2.9035 2.8338 38.09*** 33.2 
90.9 
M 2.9035 2.9099 -2.67*** -3 
 
It can be seen from Table 4 that the difference in the mean value of the feature variables of the two 
groups after the matching are significantly reduced, and the absolute value of the standardized 
difference is within 10%. Statistically speaking, the matching satisfies the balance assumption well. At 
the same time, only a small number of samples (2 in the treat group and 13 in the control group) fell 
outside the common support domain, which also satisfactorily satisfied the common support 
hypothesis. 
Next, this article performs regression according to formula (2). After the full sample regression, it is 
also divided into small, medium and large companies according to the scale, and the regression is 
performed. The results are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Internal Investors Imitate External Investors 
 
Full sample Small  Medium Big 
 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 × ∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 0.0353*** 0.0555*** 0.0468*** 0.0259* 
 
(0.00645) (0.0195) (0.00759) (0.0132) 
𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 0.0309 0.0240 0.0859 0.133 
 
(0.0656) (0.0796) (0.126) (0.192) 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 1.270*** 1.019** 1.789** 0.984 
 
(0.415) (0.490) (0.825) (1.486) 
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡 -0.0541*** -0.0517*** -0.0175 0.00490 
 
(0.0121) (0.0175) (0.0190) (0.0348) 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡 0.108*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 0.0684*** 
 
(0.00795) (0.0111) (0.0127) (0.0211) 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 -2.345*** -2.043* -0.996 -1.456 
 
(0.680) (1.121) (1.008) (1.427) 
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 -0.0207 -0.123** 0.00969 0.199** 
 
(0.0350) (0.0529) (0.0524) (0.0794) 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡 0.0182*** 0.0170*** 0.0194*** 0.0269*** 
 
(0.000827) (0.000949) (0.00178) (0.00469) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗,𝑡 -0.0138 0.0469 0.0400 -0.180 
 
(0.0491) (0.0727) (0.0766) (0.126) 
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𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡 0.00574 0.00346 0.00615 0.0352 
 
(0.00838) (0.0108) (0.0145) (0.0249) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 0.0173* 0.0249* 0.0352** -0.0187 
 
(0.0102) (0.0131) (0.0178) (0.0315) 
𝑆𝑂𝐸 1.785*** 1.559*** 1.856*** 1.132 
 
(0.387) (0.525) (0.626) (1.198) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑗,𝑡 -0.0944 0.0238 -0.207** 0.0425 
 
(0.0574) (0.0760) (0.0914) (0.172) 
𝐵𝑟𝑔4 -1.399** 0.685 -1.823* 0.682 
 
(0.653) (1.343) (1.031) (1.187) 
𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 0.0116 0.698 -0.529 -4.127*** 
 
(0.365) (0.440) (0.660) (1.375) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡 1.854*** 2.539*** 1.006* 2.489** 
 
(0.344) (0.471) (0.563) (1.152) 
𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 -8.216*** -4.902*** -8.697*** -6.433** 
 (1.016) (1.414) (1.645) (2.805) 
Constant 134.3*** 133.8*** 130.1*** 49.80*** 
 
(5.878) (7.883) (10.11) (19.02) 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 yes yes yes yes 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 yes yes yes yes 
Obs. 68,014 41,524 21,297 5,193 
R2 0.074 0.088 0.064 0.052 
Note. The value of t in parentheses, *, **, *** represent significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively, the same below. 
 
As shown in Table 5, in the full sample regression, the coefficient of 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 × ∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 is 
positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that after the implementation of the land-port link, 
external investors in the previous period increased holdings, and the internal investors also increased 
their holdings in the current period. In the previous period, the external investors reduced their holdings, 
and the current internal investors also reduced holdings. That is, the internal investors did imitate 
external investments. The 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 × ∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 coefficient of the medium company is positive 
and significant at the 1% level, and the 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 × ∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 coefficient of the large company 
is positive and the 10% level is significant, indicating that small and medium-sized companies have 
more imitations, and large companies may have invested with qualified foreign institutional investors 
such as QFII before the implementation of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, and the large 
companies themselves have higher information collection and analysis capabilities. Although the 
imitation of newly entered external funds is not as strong as that of small and medium-sized companies, 
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there is also a more obvious imitation. 
In summary, the hypothesis that H2 is confirmed indicates that after the implementation of Land-Hong 
Kong Stock Connect mechanism, internal investors have imitated the behavior of external investors. 
4.4 Conduction of Imitation Behavior: Investor Network 
Further research assumes H3. First, calculate the network density of stocks containing external 
investors according to equations (3), (4) and (5), and then perform regression based on equation (6). 
The regression results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Investor Network Density 
 
Full sample Small Medium Big 
Variable ∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 
𝑅𝐶𝑗 1.981*** 1.498 1.252 3.388*** 
 
(-0.668) (-1.182) (-1.19) (-0.981) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 × ∆𝐸𝑥_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 0.0420*** 0.0752*** 0.0226 0.0790** 
 
(-0.0131) (-0.0242) (-0.0163) (-0.0342) 
𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 -0.135 -0.128 -0.322 1.059 
 
(-0.257) (-0.318) (-0.434) (-1.141) 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 1.179 0.294 1.775 5.291 
 
(-1.315) (-1.649) (-2.369) (-4.527) 
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡 -0.00872 -0.00198 0.0026 0.128 
 
(-0.0316) (-0.0509) (-0.0511) (-0.077) 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡 0.0726*** 0.0467* 0.0993*** 0.0278 
 
(-0.0189) (-0.0259) (-0.0307) (-0.0525) 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 -1.398 -3.677* -0.205 0.491 
 
(-1.283) (-2.158) (-2.168) (-2.039) 
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 -0.0671 -0.172** 0.0588 0.00825 
 
(-0.066) (-0.0789) (-0.13) (-0.152) 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡 0.0210*** 0.0147*** 0.0248*** 0.0403** 
 
(-0.00274) (-0.00311) (-0.00552) (-0.0154) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗,𝑡 -0.104 0.121 -0.231 -0.171 
 
(-0.119) (-0.168) (-0.212) (-0.263) 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡 0.0236 0.0139 0.0242 0.0503 
 
(-0.0212) (-0.029) (-0.0357) (-0.0575) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 0.0397 0.0476 0.0367 0.0497 
 
(-0.0268) (-0.0359) (-0.0453) (-0.093) 
𝑆𝑂𝐸 2.707*** 3.121** 2.132 2.46 
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(-0.935) (-1.299) (-1.591) (-1.964) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑗,𝑡 -0.0258 0.258 -0.142 0.152 
 
(-0.143) (-0.223) (-0.215) (-0.358) 
𝐵𝑟𝑔4 -0.759 -1.068 0.174 3.529 
 
(-1.115) (-3.363) (-1.627) (-2.726) 
𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 -0.519 -1.8 3.726* -6.572*** 
 
(-1.071) (-1.297) (-2.012) (-2.271) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡 0.108 -0.655 0.252 2.043 
 
(-0.846) (-1.136) (-1.329) (-2.976) 
𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 -2.993 1.535 -2.034 -4.005 
 
(-2.638) (-3.705) (-4.517) (-6.193) 
Constant 85.59*** 115.4*** 53.93* -34.89 
 
(-18.61) (-24.74) (-31.94) (-53.81) 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 yes yes yes yes 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 yes yes yes yes 
Obs. 8,602 4,303 3,283 1,016 
R2 0.049 0.066 0.047 0.092 
 
It can be seen from Table 6 that under the entire sample, the residual network density coefficient is 
positive and significant at the level of 1%, indicating that overall internal investors do obtain external 
investor information through the investor network density to imitate external investment. However, it 
can be found that the network residual density coefficient of small and medium companies is positive 
but not significant, while the network residual density of large companies is significantly positive at the 
1% level. The regression results show that the imitation behavior of small and medium-sized 
companies may not be transmitted through the investor network, but through other channels, the 
imitation behavior of large companies is indeed transmitted through the investor network. 
The reason why the small and medium-sized company’s network residual density regression results are 
not significant may be that there are fewer external institutional investors who invest in small and 
medium-sized companies. Small and medium-sized companies can obtain less external investor 
information through the network and have a slower acquisition speed. External investors, and the large 
companies themselves have a stronger ability to obtain and process information. In addition, external 
institutional investors are more willing to invest in large companies with more standardized information 
disclosure, and external investors available in the network. There is more information and the speed of 
acquisition is faster. Therefore, the investment behavior of internal investors through the network 
containing external investor information will inevitably exist in reference to the investment behavior of 
external investors. To sum up, the regression results partially support the hypothesis H3. As for how 
small and medium-sized companies obtain external investment information, further research is needed. 
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4.5 Robustness Test 
1. The PSM matching radius of 0.01 is used in this article. The main results remain unchanged after 
changing to 0.005 matching radius. 
2. In order to prevent the “pseudo herd” behavior, we use the data that is one period behind. In fact, we 
try to lag two periods in the test. It is found that the imitation behavior of small and medium-sized 
companies is still significant, but the imitation behavior of large companies is no longer significant. 
The possible reason is that due to the limitation of data, the lag period is too long, and large companies 
can obtain foreign capital information quickly fast response to foreign investment behavior, while the 
ability of small and medium-sized companies to obtain information is weak and slow, which leads to 
the situation that small and medium-sized companies are still significant but large companies are no 
longer significant. 
3. In the quarterly reports of listed companies, there are some new investors, which will have a certain 
impact on the research of herding behavior. The main conclusions of this article remain unchanged 
after excluding the impact of new investors. 
 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
Based on the quarterly data of all A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2019, this article uses the 
multi period double difference model to explore the causes and transmission mechanism of the linkage 
effect of the stock prices of the two cities after the implementation of Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect. 
The results show that: first, after the implementation of “Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect”, the degree 
of herd behavior of domestic investors as a whole becomes higher, and the larger the company scale is, 
the higher the degree of herd behavior of investors is; secondly, after the implementation of 
“Land-Hong Kong Stock Connect”, all listed companies have the behavior of internal investors 
imitating external investors, and the imitation behavior of small and medium-sized companies is 
significant; finally, from the overall sample from the point of view, the imitation behavior of internal 
investors is indeed conducted through the investor network, but it is subdivided into three categories: 
large, medium and small companies. Only the imitation transmission path of large companies is the 
investor network, and the imitation path of small and medium companies is unknown, which needs 
further study. 
According to the empirical results, the policy implications of this article are as follows: firstly, the 
government should further cultivate the investors’ rational investment awareness and reduce irrational 
imitation; secondly, the government should further standardize the information disclosure system of the 
company and improve the transparency of the company’s information; finally, the government should 
speed up the improvement of the supporting system of interconnection and maintain the two ports 
Stable development of the land. 
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